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I. Introduction
As a result of one potentially inadvertent sentence in a 1942 Supreme Court opinion,1
commercial speech has been plagued with second-class status within the First Amendment.2
After receiving no First Amendment protection for over three decades, commercial speech
finally entered the realm of constitutional protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.3 Years later, the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York4 established a
four-part balancing test to assess validity of governmental regulations on commercial speech.5
While courts have uniformly applied the Central Hudson test to commercial speech regulations,
the outcomes of the analyses have proven to be anything but uniform.6
No area of commercial speech has better displayed the stark contrast in judicial review
under Central Hudson than vice advertising. Vice advertising, as used throughout this Comment,
refers to the promotion of products or activities that are legal but may pose a threat to the health
and morals of the public.7 The Court has done an about-face in its evaluation of vice advertising
restrictions, casually deferring to the government’s discretion in the earliest cases and rigorously
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629 (1990) (opining
that the Court “plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air”). See also infra Part II.A.
2
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (“This Court's decisions on
commercial expression have rested on the premise that such speech, although meriting some protection, is of less
constitutional moment than other forms of speech.”).
3
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
5
Id. at 566.
6
See e.g., Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The
Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 267-68 (2003) (stating that the Court has
been applying Central Hudson with “varying degrees of rigor” to commercial speech); Arlen W. Langvardt, The
Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons From Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 587, 588-589 (2000) (“[T]he Court's decisions have offered inconsistent
signals about the intensity--or lack of intensity--of the First Amendment protection for commercial speech.”); Robert
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (“Lacking firm jurisprudential
foundations, commercial speech doctrine has veered wildly between divergent and inconsistent approaches.”);
Daniel E. Troy, Advertising Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. REG. 85, 123 (1999) (arguing that “the subjective
Central Hudson test . . . has produced an inconsistent Supreme Court commercial speech jurisprudence and sowed
confusion in the lower courts. . . .”).
7
See generally 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (U.S. 1996).
1

scrutinizing the vice regulations in the most recent cases.8 While the evolution of Central
Hudson can be viewed as a victory for commercial speech, it also demonstrates a problem: the
Central Hudson analysis may be so malleable and subjective that it can no longer effectively
safeguard the First Amendment interests at stake.
The Central Hudson issue becomes most concerning in the vice advertising context,
where the government often has laudable interests in enacting legislation that restricts advertising
certain products to certain groups of people or in certain locations. However commendable the
government’s objectives may be, an encroachment on First Amendment freedoms demands
consistent and scrupulous review by the judiciary, which the Supreme Court eventually made
clear throughout the vice cases.9 Nevertheless, Central Hudson still leaves room to maneuver,
and the Court has failed to agree on some important aspects of the analysis.10 These downfalls
are evident in the Third and Fourth Circuits’ conflicting determinations when scrutinizing similar
vice advertising restrictions.11
This comment examines special issues within the vice advertising subset of the
commercial speech doctrine. Part II provides a history of the commercial speech doctrine, from
its misunderstood inception to its analytical framework as set out in Central Hudson. Part III
focuses on the Supreme Court’s application and refinement of Central Hudson in vice
advertising regulations. Part IV explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ application of Central
Hudson to similar alcohol advertisement regulations in their respective circuits. Part V analyzes
the Fourth Circuit’s decision and its deviance from Supreme Court precedent and speculates on

8

Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) with Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
9
See infra note 6.
10
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (“[S]everal Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson
analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases.”).
11
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.

why such deviations are likely to occur. Finally, Part VI summarizes the progression of Central
Hudson’s application to vice advertising and opines on the future of the doctrine.
II. Underpinnings of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
In a 1942 decision, the Supreme Court declared that advertising was not within the scope
of the First Amendment.12 Whether the Court’s decision was “ill-conceived”13 or merely a sign
of the times,14 commercial speech remained unprotected until the 1970s. In Virginia Board, the
Court recognized the value of commercial speech and the First Amendment interests at stake and
expressly afforded constitutional protection to advertising for the first time.15 Central Hudson
tied up Virginia Board’s loose ends by creating a four-pronged adaptation of intermediate
scrutiny to assess the validity of regulations on commercial speech.16
A. The Pre-Protection Period
The Justices of the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, created the commercial
speech doctrine in Valentine v. Chrestensen,17 whether they realized it or not. Mr. Chrestensen,
an entrepreneur, had attempted to promote his business by distributing handbills in the streets of
New York City until Police Commissioner Valentine notified him that such activity was in
violation of §318 of the Sanitary Code, which forbade distribution of commercial
advertisements.18 Instead of taking his business elsewhere, a clever Chrestensen chose to print
double-sided handbills, with one side remaining a commercial advertisement and the other side
consisting of a political protest against the City Dock Department.19 The police restrained

12

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
See infra text accompanying note 28.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
15
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, (1976).
16
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
17
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
18
Id. at 55.
19
Id.
13

Chrestensen from distributing his double-sided handbills and a lawsuit followed.20 In its
decision, the Court laid the foundation for a brand new subclass of speech in one sentence: “We
are . . . clear that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.”21 The Court did not cite any authority or discuss reasons for its
assertion. Moreover, the opinion was written, circulated, and approved by the Justices in only
nine days, suggesting that this case was not a particularly important one.22
Considering the significance of this case to the commercial speech doctrine, it is puzzling
that the most esteemed judiciary in the country did not hesitate in concluding that commercial
speech did not enjoy First Amendment protection. It seems likely that the holding in Valentine
has little to do with commercial speech as it is known today and a lot to do with the status of
“advertising” in 1942.23 A mere five years after “the switch in time that saved nine” when the
Court abandoned the notion of economic substantive due process, the Valentine Court would
have been reluctant to strike down a state’s economic regulation.24 At that time, Chrestenson’s
advertising was not viewed as speech, but rather as occupational activities subject to state
regulation.25 In fact, the term “commercial speech” did not enter the courtroom vocabulary until
the 1970s.26
Fortunately, the broad, hasty exclusion of commercial speech from constitutional
protection was transient. Justice Douglas, who was a member of the Valentine Court, later

20

Id.
Id. at 58.
22
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747,
757 (1993).
23
Kozinski, supra note 22, at 763 (suggesting the Court’s opinion appeared to address an economic due process
issue, not a speech issue). See also Troy, supra note 6, at 122.
24
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (adopting rational basis review of
economic legislation). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
25
Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (“Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets . . . are matters for legislative judgment.”).
26
Kozinski, supra note 22, at 756.
21

opined that the Court’s ruling was “casual, almost offhand . . . [a]nd it has not survived
reflection.”27 He subsequently reiterated that the ruling was “ill-conceived” and contended that
the commercial form or content of a publication should not render speech unprotected.28
Several other Justices eventually joined Justice Douglas and began to express concern
over the validity of Valentine’s holding in dissenting opinions.29 Meanwhile, the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan30 and Pittsburgh Press holdings displayed the gradual erosion of Valentine.
In Sullivan, the Court conveyed full First Amendment protection to an allegedly libelous,
political statement even though it was a paid advertisement.31 Pittsburgh Press followed
Sullivan’s lead, stating that the “critical feature” of Valentine’s handbill was that “it did no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”32 While the Court’s decisions did not go so far as to
abrogate the doctrine, they certainly qualified Valentine’s holding to “purely commercial
advertising,” or speech that did not also include noncommercial elements.33
The First Amendment’s protection of advertisements was somewhat recognized in
Bigelow v. Virginia.34 The Court expressly limited Valentine to its facts, finding the case
“obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.”35
The Court emphasized that the constitutionality of a speech regulation, regardless of how the
speech is labeled, is to be determined by weighing the alleged governmental interest against the

27

Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring).
29
See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314-15 & n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ.); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
401 & n.6 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31
Sullivan held that unlike the handbills in Valentine, the political advertisement at issue received full First
Amendment protection because it conveyed information, opinions, and ideas. 376 U.S. at 266.
32
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.
33
Id.; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
34
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
35
Id. at 819-20.
28

First Amendment interests.36 Therefore, the court concluded advertisements are not exempt from
the First Amendment’s purview.37 However, Bigelow went on to note that the advertisement at
issue went beyond merely proposing a commercial transaction by including “factual material of
clear public interest.”38 Because of this allusion to the advertisement’s noncommercial subject
matter, a small gray area remained around speech that solely promoted commercial matters.
B. The Virginia Board Case
If Bigelow was the death knell of Valentine, consider Virginia Board to be its funeral.
The regulation at issue was a Virginia statute prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug
prices, aimed at protecting consumers by preserving the integrity of the pharmaceutical
profession.39 Unlike Bigelow, the Court was now dealing with speech that was void of
noncommercial elements, that did “no more than propose a commercial transaction,”40 and asked
“whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.”41 The
Court answered that question in the negative and invalidated the statute, upholding First
Amendment protection to pure commercial speech for the first time.42
In making its decision, the Court reached three noteworthy conclusions. Firstly, the
Court stated that the First Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the right to
receive information.43 Consequently, protected speech encompasses both the right to advertise
and the right to receive the advertising.44

36

Id. at 826.
Id. at 825.
38
Id. at 822. The Court highlighted that sections of the advertisement relayed factual information that was
potentially valuable to a wide range of readers, namely that abortion was legal in New York. Id.
39
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752, 766 (U.S. 1976).
40
Id. at 762.
41
Id. at 761.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 756-57.
44
Id. at 757.
37

Second, the Court rejected that the State’s paternalistic motives in suppressing price
information were sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment rights of the advertiser, the
consumer, and society in general.45 As to the First Amendment interests at stake, the Court
declared that the advertiser’s purely financial interest in the commercial speech does not rescind
his or her constitutional protection.46 The consumer’s interest in “the free flow of commercial
information” could be just as strong as his or her interest in receiving political information.47
This particular interest was especially relevant in this instance because the individuals most
affected by the price ban were the poor, the ill, and the elderly.48 Finally, the Court speculated
that society, as part of a free enterprise economy, benefits from uninhibited dissemination of
commercial information because it ensures that economic decision-making is well-informed.49
The Court conceded that upholding the high standards of pharmacists and thereby
protecting consumers was a strong interest, but was troubled by the implications of the State’s
method.50 The Court reasoned that the ban had no direct effect on pharmacists’ professionalism,
but instead operated on the presumption that consumers with the free flow of price information
will make decisions against their own best interests.51 It went on to propose a different
assumption: “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them.”52 Neither the Court nor the legislature is
entitled to choose between the two approaches because it is the First Amendment that makes the

45

Id. at 770.
Id. at 762.
47
Id. at 763.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 766.
50
Id. at 768-69.
51
Id. at 769-70.
52
Id. at 770.
46

determination.53 Thus, Virginia could not maintain the standards of its pharmacists “by keeping
the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.”54
Finally, the Court set out two “commonsense differences” between commercial speech
and other forms of expression that “justified a different degree of protection . . . to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.”55 First off, commercial
speech is more objective than other forms of speech because it is easier to verify its accuracy.56
Second, commercial speech is more durable than other types of speech because it essential to
commercial profits.57 The Court suggested that such features “may make it less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.”58 These differences are
meaningful because it is one of the few occasions in which the Court explained why commercial
speech may be less deserving of full First Amendment protection.59 It also is worth noting that
the Court sanctioned a different degree of First Amendment protection only for the purposes of
achieving veracity,60 and not to allow the State to suppress information it may deem harmful.
C. The Central Hudson Analysis
Virginia Board’s call for a “different degree of protection” for commercial speech was
answered by Central Hudson,61 the foundation of the modern commercial speech doctrine. The
majority opinion recapitulated prior commercial speech caselaw and a found that the cases
developed a four-step judicial analysis for evaluating a restriction on commercial speech:62 “At
53

Id.
Id.
55
Id. at 772 n.24.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
KOZINSKI, supra note 1, at 634.
60
Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 722 n.24 (“Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial
speech is valueless . . . they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.”(emphasis added)).
61
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
62
Id. at 561-66.
54

the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading.”63 This prong reflects the view that the First Amendment seeks to protect the
informational purpose of commercial speech, and therefore the Constitution permits suppression
of deceptive or illicit commercial communication.64 “Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial.”65 If the first two criteria have been met, the analysis will
move on to the third and fourth inquiries, which consider “whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.”66
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens, although concurring with the judgment, did
not subscribe to the majority’s reasoning.67 Justice Blackmun denied that a lower level of
judicial scrutiny is appropriate when the State seeks to outlaw accurate and lawful
communication in order to depress consumer demand for a product.68 He found that
governmental restraint on information regarding a legal product is “a covert attempt . . . to
manipulate the choices of its citizens . . . by depriving the public of the information needed to
make a free choice.”69 By avoiding direct regulation of the underlying commercial object, the
government may shield its primary motives from the public eye and attain its ultimate goal by
withholding information that its citizens need to make a voluntary choice.70 This modus
operandi goes against the very essence of the First Amendment.71 Justice Blackmun also

63

Id. at 566.
Id. at 563-64.
65
Id. at 566.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 574-75.
70
Id. at 575.
71
Id.
64

criticized the majority’s interpretation of the cases from which the four-step test was derived.72
The majority’s approach, allowing the State to suppress truthful, nonmisleading, and lawful
commercial communication in order to manipulate public choices, is discordant with Virginia
Board and the other Supreme Court precedent that the majority cited, all of which outright
rejected such a proposition.73
Justice Stevens found little need to ruminate upon the majority’s test because he did not
view Central Hudson as a commercial speech case.74 His concurrence illuminated one of the
central problems with the doctrine: the difficulty of defining “commercial speech.”75 He
analyzed two definitions described by the majority and found neither to be satisfactory.76
Defining commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience" subsumes far too much expression that is entitled to the greatest degree
of protection, such as utterances at a labor strike and an economist’s financial study.77 Neither
the financial motives of the speaker nor the audience, in Justice Stevens’ view, should confine
the constitutional protection afforded to the message.78 He found that the second definition,
“speech proposing a commercial transaction," might be too constricted to be an adequate
description.79 Regardless of how the term is defined, Justice Stevens stated that New York’s ban
on “promotional advertising” effectively proscribed too many types of expression to fall within
the commercial speech category.80

72

Id. at 576-579 & n.3.
Id. (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
74
Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75
Id. at 579-80.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 579-80.
78
Id. at 580.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 580-81.
73

III. The Vice Cases
Despite its shortcomings, the Central Hudson test was a step in the right direction. The
majority opinion solidified the protection given to commercial speech and assured a consistent
analytical framework for reviewing commercial speech restrictions. Or did it? In the three
decades since Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has dealt with First Amendment challenges to
regulations on vice advertising six times, and the opinions demonstrate irresolute levels of
scrutiny.81 In the early cases, Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the Court unraveled the very core
purposes of the commercial speech doctrine by deferring to paternalistic legislative goals and
insinuating that vice advertising could be banned entirely.82 In the four cases that followed,
Rubin, 44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans, and Lorillard, the Court abandoned the rationale it
adopted in the prior vice cases and became progressively more demanding of the government to
sustain the evidentiary burdens of the third and fourth prongs.83
A. The Early Cases
In Posadas, the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson produced a 5-4 decision
upholding Puerto Rico’s prohibition on casino advertisements targeting Puerto Rico citizens.84
The legislature argued that the ban reduced residents’ demand for gambling and protected its
citizens from gambling’s “serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare.”85 Finding
that the speech was lawful and not deceptive and that Puerto Rico’s interest in the welfare of its

81

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173 (1999); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
82
See discussion infra Part III.A.
83
See discussion infra Part III.B.
84
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344.
85
Id. at 341.

citizens was substantial, the Court went on to evaluate the relationship between the Legislature’s
means and ends.86
Posada’s majority opinion, written Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the regulation
“clearly” furthered the government’s interest simply because the legislature reasonably believed
casino advertisements would increase residents’ demand for gambling.87 The majority also
“th[ought] it clear beyond peradventure” that the advertising prohibition was narrowly tailored to
advance the legislature’s interests because the casinos were permitted to target tourists.88 The
challenging casino asserted that the First Amendment obliges Puerto Rico to propagate counterspeech to discourage gambling, rather than banning speech that may promote gambling.89 The
Court again deferred to the legislature and dispelled the suggestion: “The legislature could
conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of
casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such
potentially harmful conduct.”90 In addition to greatly diminishing the force of the third and
fourth prongs by yielding to the government’s judgments and protective motives, the majority
found that a State’s power to proscribe an activity or product, especially vice products like
cigarettes or alcoholic beverages, includes the lesser power to decrease demand for that object by
suppressing speech.91 Justice Rehnquist asserted that it would be “a strange constitutional
doctrine” to permit the state to entirely prohibit an activity but deny the state’s power to “forbid
the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising.”92

86

Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 342.
88
Id. at 343.
89
Id. at 344.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 345-46.
92
Id. at 346. The majority’s “greater includes the lesser” rationale was not very well-received by the dissenters. Id.
at 355 n.4 ((Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). As Justice Brennan poignantly noted,
87

Seven years later, Edge Broadcasting exhibited another lenient application of the Central
Hudson analysis.93 The Court upheld a federal lottery regulation that, among other things,
prohibited broadcasters from advertising state lotteries unless the broadcaster was licensed in that
state.94 In its commercial speech analysis, the Court declared that the third query of the Central
Hudson test should consider whether the regulation directly advanced the government's
legitimate interest in a general sense, regardless of whether it did so in a particular case.95
Deferring to Congressional “commonsense judgment,” the Court established that the statutory
ban directly pursued the interest in supporting the policies of lottery and nonlottery States.96 In
regard to the final Central Hudson factor, the Court clarified that the "no more extensive than
necessary" requirement of the test does not require a perfect fit between the restriction and the
governmental interest, only a reasonable one.97 Suggesting that Congress could have banned all
broadcast advertisements of lotteries, the Court concluded the ban was sufficiently narrow.98
In essence, Posadas and Edge Broadcasting displayed the Supreme Court’s flimsiest
application of Central Hudson yet.99 In both cases, the Court blindly assumed that the
regulations furthered the asserted interests at stake, relying on nothing more than legislative
speculation to pass the third prong of Central Hudson.100 Also, the Court in both instances
determined the restrictions were narrowly tailored because they were not complete bans.101
Finally, Posadas reasoned, and Edge Broadcasting agreed, that governmental ability to prohibit
lawful speech and not the act of gambling receives constitutional protection, and the “strange constitutional
doctrine” prohibiting such speech bans is called the First Amendment. Id.
93
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
94
Id. at 422.
95
Id. at 430.
96
Id. at 428.
97
Id. at 357.
98
Id. at 357.
99
Since Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the Court has required the State to meet higher evidentiary standards in
the third and fourth prongs. See infra Part III.B.
100
See supra notes 90, 93, 99 and accompanying text.
101
See supra notes 91, 101 and accompanying text.

an activity translates into the power to constrain advertising about that activity.102 Remarkably,
these two cases, the only “vice” cases between 1986 and 1993, were the only decisions that
upheld regulations on commercial speech under Central Hudson.103 While First Amendment
protection of commercial speech was flourishing in most areas, it certainly was dwindling in the
“vice” subset of commercial expression.
B. The later cases
In Rubin, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed to strike down a federal ban on
disclosure of the alcohol content on beer labels as a means to prevent alcohol strength wars.104
Slightly retreating from Posadas, the Rubin Court refused to concede that the government has
greater freedom to regulate speech promoting “socially harmful activities” that could be
banned.105 The Court duly noted that Posadas’ “greater includes the lesser” argument was not
the basis for the Court’s decision upholding the ban, but came later in the opinion.106 The Rubin
Court also refused to accept the government’s “common sense” theory,107 adopting a
strengthened version of the Central Hudson’s third prong that required the government to
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to
a material degree."108 The overall irrationality of the regulatory scheme and the government’s
failure to supply persuasive evidence prevented the restriction from directly advancing the
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See supra notes 94-95, 101 and accompanying text.
See Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising under the Supreme Court's Commercial
Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 362 (2000).
104
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995). Justice Stevens is the only member of the Court who did
not join the majority opinion. Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). He concurred reasoned that
Central Hudson should not apply to a regulation that bans “truthful, unadorned, informative speech” to keep
consumers uninformed. Id. at 491, 496. Justice Stevens later advocated this position when he wrote his plurality
opinion in 44 Liquormart. See 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 501-04 (1996).
105
Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2.
106
Id.
107
The government attempted to pass the third prong by appealing to the common sense rationale, suggesting “a
restriction on the advertising of a product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers select a product
on the basis of that trait.” Id. at 487.
108
Id.
103

substantial interest of preventing alcohol strength wars.109 The Court went on to reject the
government’s position that the regulation was narrowly tailored because it was not a complete
ban on alcohol content disclosures, an argument that the Court sustained in Posadas and Edge
Broadcasting.110 Instead, the Court concluded that the statute was broader than necessary
because Congress could have achieved its interest without implicating First Amendment
rights.111
In its 44 Liquormart decision, the Court struck down a Rhode Island ban on price
advertising for alcoholic beverages in four separate opinions.112 Justice Stevens penned the
principal opinion and reaffirmed the stance he took in Rubin’s concurrence, which stressed the
need to carefully scrutinize the government’s objectives in suppressing speech.113 An intention
to protect consumers from deception or overreaching warrants less than strict scrutiny because it
is consistent with the “commonsense distinctions” between commercial and noncommercial
speech.114 But “bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect
consumers . . . . Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental
policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”115

Id. at 488-89. The Court found the legitimacy of the government’s goal to be weakened by the statute’s other
provisions, mandating the disclosure of alcohol content in wines and spirits and allowing brewers to label their
product as “malt liquor.” Id. Such inconsistencies would “ensure[] the labeling ban will fail to achieve [its] end.” Id.
at 489.
110
Id. at 490.
111
Id. at 491.
112
See 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 495-514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Id. at 528-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113
Id. at 501-504. See also supra note 104.
114
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501-02. The “commonsense distinctions” are the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech. Id at 502 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24) (1976)).
115
Id. at 502-03.
109

Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, applied
Central Hudson and first determined the first two prongs were met.116 Under the third prong,
Rhode Island relied on the theory that a ban on prices would lead to higher prices for alcohol,
which would in turn decrease consumption.117 Stevens found this conclusion to be speculative
and insufficient to satisfy the third prong, which required the state to show evidence that the
regulation significantly and directly furthered its goal.118 The fourth prong was equally fruitless
for the state, as Stevens opined that it was "perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation
that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal
of promoting temperance.”119
Justice O’Connor wrote the other major opinion in 44 Liquormart, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and Breyer.120 In applying Central Hudson, she did not
feel the need to elaborate on the third prong because she concluded Rhode Island failed the
fourth prong of the analysis.121 In accordance with Justice Stevens’ opinion, Justice O’Connor
determined the regulation compelled an overly broad and needless restriction on truthful
information because the state had various other means to directly achieve its goal.122
Significantly, a majority of the 44 Liquormart Court expressly or impliedly rejected Posadas’
highly deferential approach and "greater includes the lesser" rationale, advocating for a more
stringent judicial review of the government’s goals and speech restrictions.123
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In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Court struck down part of a federal regulation
that, in part, banned broadcast advertising for private casinos.124 Stevens again wrote for the
Court, this time with a majority of the Justices joining, and concluded that the government had
failed to satisfy its evidentiary burdens under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.125
In determining whether the regulation directly advanced the government’s interests, the Court
drew attention to the government’s lack of empirical evidence and declined to accept the
government’s “causal chain” hypothesis.126 However, the Court found an even bigger flaw was
at hand.127 Examining the regulatory scheme as a whole, the Court found it was "so pierced with
exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it."128
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the regulation was overly broad because the government
had alternative, more direct measures to attain its goal in decreasing the harmful social effects of
gambling.129
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court invalidated Massachusetts’ outdoor and point-of-sale
advertising restrictions on tobacco products.130 Stating that the first two prongs of Central
Hudson were met, the Court addressed whether the regulations were narrowly tailored and
directly advanced Massachusetts’ interests.131 To establish that the outdoor advertising ban
would advance its interest, the state proffered various FDA and institutional studies to support
restriction put into place to further it, before accepting a State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First
Amendment scrutiny.).
124
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the notion that “product advertising stimulates demand for products, while suppressed
advertising may have the opposite effect.”132 The Court determined that although this evidence
was sufficient to pass the third prong’s muster, “[t]he broad sweep of the regulations indicate[d]
that the Attorney General did not ‘carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the
burden on speech imposed’ by the regulations.”133 The regulation not only would have
effectually banned tobacco ads in some metropolitan areas, but it also impermissibly infringed on
the First Amendment interests of adult buyers and sellers alike.134 As to the point-of-sale
advertising ban, the state could satisfy neither the third nor the fourth prong of Central
Hudson.135 The five-foot height rule was futile because some children were below five-feet tall
and the others could simply look up, and it was also insufficiently tailored.136
In their entirety, the four aforementioned cases represent the Supreme Court’s significant
turnaround in its attitude toward commercial speech. The Court no longer surrenders to
legislative discretion under the third prong, and instead demands that the government provide
meaningful evidence to demonstrate the regulation directly advances its purpose. Further, a
restriction will be invalid if the regulation or other statutory provisions contain exemptions that
undermine the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving the asserted goal. As to the fit
between the restriction and the goal, the Court no longer upholds regulations if the government
failed to consider or utilize non-speech alternatives. Finally, a speech ban will be overly broad if
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it significantly violates the protected interests of others in disseminating and receiving
commercial information.
IV. The Third and Fourth Circuit Split in Applying Central Hudson to Vice Advertising
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s latest application of Central Hudson to vice
advertising, two restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college publications were challenged
under the First Amendment, Pitt News and Educational Media Co. The Third and Fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeals, respectively, evaluated the constitutionality of two similar state laws and
applied the Central Hudson analysis in markedly different ways.
A. The Third Circuit
In 1996, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted an amendment to the Liquor Code known
as “Act 199,” 137 which in relevant part applied the following to all alcoholic and malt beverage
advertising:: “No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in any booklet,
program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, periodical, brochure, circular, or other similar
publication published by, for or in behalf of any educational institution.”138 A violation of the
statute resulted in a misdemeanor, punishable by fines up to $500 or imprisonment for 3 months
on a first charge, and a minimum jail sentence of 3 months for subsequent offenses.139 While the
history of the Act did not mention its purpose, the State claimed the relevant provision of the
statute tackled both underage drinking and binge drinking by adults and minors on college
campuses.140 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) interpreted the Act in Advisory
Notice No. 15 and explained that advertisements in media that are distributed at a school, but that
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are otherwise not connected with the school, are permissible.141 In 1999, The Pitt News, a
student-run newspaper at the University of Pittsburgh, sought to enjoin enforcement of Act 199
after losing over $17,000 in advertising revenue as a result of the statute’s enactment.142
The readers of The Pitt News consisted primarily of the university population, about 75%
of which was of the legal drinking age.143 The paper was distributed for free and was available
at 75 campus locations, along with other free, local newspapers that were not connected with the
university.144 The Pitt News acquired revenue solely from advertising, and a substantial portion
of this revenue came from alcohol ads before Act 199 took effect.145 After a local restaurant that
had placed alcohol advertisements in The Pitt News was cited for a violation of the Act in 1997,
the newspaper lost many advertising contracts.146 The paper unsuccessfully attempted to
minimize the loss of revenue by encouraging liquor licensees to place ads unrelated to alcohol.147
This proved to be unsuccessful, and The Pitt News was forced to shorten the newspaper and
eliminate space for student speech after losing about $17,000 in income in 1998.148 The loss of a
significant portion of its revenue also threatened the paper’s ability to purchase essential
equipment and to effectively compete in the marketplace.149 As a result, the paper sued
Pennsylvania state officials and claimed that Act 199 violated the First Amendment rights of the
newspaper, its advertisers, and its adult readers.150
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The district court denied the paper’s request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of Act 199, finding that The Pitt News lacked standing because the paper suffered
an indirect, economic injury.151 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that although The
Pitt News had standing to bring its claim, it nevertheless did not show a likelihood of success on
the merits of its claim.152 The court reasoned that Act 199 did not directly harm the newspaper,
and the injury asserted by the paper was merely a secondary effect of a statute directed at the
advertisers.153 Additionally, the regulation did not prevent The Pitt News from publishing
information on alcoholic beverages so long as the paper did not get paid for it.154 Thus, the court
concluded, the incidental injury caused by Act 199 was not an infringement on newspaper’s First
Amendment rights.155
Four years later, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the Commonwealth and found that Act 199 was unconstitutional as an
impermissible restriction on commercial speech.156 The court’s opinion, written by Justice Alito
before he joined the Supreme Court, first determined that the imposition of a financial burden on
certain types of speech, what the court previously deemed an “incidental economic effect,”157
was indeed a restriction on commercial speech subject to the Central Hudson test.158 Under the
first prong, the Third Circuit found that the contemplated advertisements were not misleading
and related to the legitimate sale of alcohol.159 The court then stated that the Commonwealth’s

151

Id.
Id.
153
Fisher, 215 F.3d at 367.
154
Id. at 366.
155
Id.
156
Pappert, 379 F.3d at 113. The 3rd Circuit also found that Act 199 was unconstitutional for another reason: the
Act unjustifiably imposed a financial burden on a particular segment of the media. Id. at 111.
157
See Fisher, 215 F.3d at 366 (concluding that the plaintiff’s advertising loss “amounts to nothing more than an
incidental economic effect of a regulation aimed closely at third parties.”).
158
Pappert, 379 F.3d at 106.
159
Id.
152

interests in minimizing underage and binge drinking were substantial.160 However, Act 199
failed to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the analysis.161
Under the third prong, the State failed to prove that an advertising ban in a small segment
of the media furthered its interests in curbing abusive and underage drinking.162 While the court
acknowledged a general link between alcoholic beverage ads and increased consumption, it
opined that the State could not rely on such a general connection when the Act did not “greatly
reduc[e] the quantity of alcoholic beverage ads viewed by underage and abusive drinkers on the
Pitt campus.”163 Despite the ban on ads in collegiate publications, the students would still be
bombarded by alcohol ads in other media, such as the other local newspapers available for free
next to The Pitt News.164 The State’s contention that abolishing alcohol ads in educational
publications would stifle abusive and underage drinking was, in the court’s opinion, “counter
intuitive and unsupported by any evidence” that the State proffered.165
In evaluating the fourth prong, the court rejected that Act 199 was sufficiently tailored to
combat problem drinking in college students for two reasons.166 The court first noted that a
substantial majority of Pitt students were of the legal drinking age and so the regulation, like the
one in Lorillard,167 infringed upon the rights of adults to receive accurate information pertaining
to products they were permitted to buy.168 Second, the court declared that strictly enforcing
consumption laws on college campuses was the most direct method of achieving the State’s
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goals.169 The State did not establish that it utilized the more direct, non-speech alternative and
thus did not demonstrate a reasonable fit between the Act and its goals.170
Because the regulation could not meet the Central Hudson criteria, the court enjoined the
State from enforcing Act 199 against The Pitt News advertisers.171 Furthermore, the PLCB cited
to Pitt News in an Advisory Notice and a Legal Opinion, clarifying that the Third Circuit’s
holding extended beyond just the alcohol ads in The Pitt News.172 The notice stated that “[u]ntil
recently, colleges and universities were considered to be subject to the print advertisement ban
affecting educational institutions,” but that the Third Circuit found the ban unconstitutional when
applied to college newspapers.173 The official opinion issued in 2009 left little room for
ambiguity when it advised a licensee that in light of the court’s ruling, “college print media is an
open venue for alcohol advertisements.”174 The interpretations of Act 199 in the Advisory
Notice and the Legal Opinion bind the board’s enforcement division,175 and consequently it
seems that the Act’s prohibition on alcohol ads in college publications is no longer viable.
B. The Fourth Circuit
The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) Board issued the regulation at issue in
the Fourth Circuit, 3 VAC 5-20-40(B)(3), which bans advertising beer, wine, or mixed drinks in
college student publications unless the advertisement was for a dining establishment.176 A
“college student publication” is defined as “any college or university publication that is prepared,
169
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edited or published primarily by students at such institution, is sanctioned as a curricular or
extra-curricular activity by such institution and which is distributed or intended to be distributed
primarily to persons under 21 years of age.”177 Although dining establishments are permitted to
advertise under the regulation, such advertisements could not refer to specific brands or prices
and were limited to using the following terms: "A.B.C. on-premises," "beer," "wine," "mixed
beverages," "cocktails," or a combination of the words.178 The suggested first offense penalty for
violating the regulation is a $500 fine or a 7-day liquor license suspension.179 The ABC Board
contended that the regulation, which had been in existence since at least the 1970’s, furthered the
State’s interests in diminishing underage and binge drinking on college campuses. 180
The Collegiate Times at Virginia Tech and The Cavalier Daily at the University of
Virginia (UVA) were “college student publications” subject to 3 VAC 5-20-40(B).181 Both
publications were distributed free of charge on their respective campuses and in the surrounding
communities, generating revenue almost exclusively through advertising.182 Like the publication
in Pitt News, both papers were available alongside competing, non-student run newspapers that
were not subject to the regulation.183 The majority of readers of either publication was at least
twenty-one years old.184 The Collegiate Times and The Cavalier Daily each approximated
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annual losses of $30,000 in alcohol advertisement sales and asserted that the regulation was an
impermissible restriction of commercial speech under the First Amendment.185
The Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment for the newspapers, finding
that 3 VAC 5-20-40(B) failed the Central Hudson test and hence violated the First
Amendment.186 The court determined that the First Amendment afforded protection to alcohol
advertisements in the publications, noting that the sale of alcohol is not inherently illegal and a
majority of readers could lawfully purchase alcohol. 187 The plaintiffs stipulated, and the court
agreed, that Virginia’s interest in reducing underage and excessive consumption of alcohol was
substantial.188 The court’s focus then shifted to the third and fourth prong, where the
Commonwealth of Virginia could not meet its evidentiary burden.189
While assessing whether 3 VAC 5-20-40(B) alleviated problem drinking on college
campuses, the district court stated that the absolute dearth of data regarding the regulation’s
effect on underage or abusive drinking had created “an insurmountable barrier” to sustaining its
validity.190 The court also refuted the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness, who
asserted that prohibiting alcohol advertisements in college newspapers would curb consumption
because such newspapers are unique media outlets with no adequate substitutes.191 The court
found his claim regarding the inimitability of college newspapers was unfounded, and further
determined that his theory completely disregarded the media-saturated world that students live in
today.192 The court, citing to Pitt News, refused to overlook the fact that 3 VAC 5-20-40(B)

185

Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *8, *11-12.
Id. at *55.
187
Id. at *33.
188
Id. at *33-34.
189
See id. at *34-53.
190
Id. *43-44.
191
Id. at *46.
192
Id.
186

closed off only one method of advertising, leaving a vast array of other forms of media
unregulated.193
The regulation’s inconsistencies and overly broad sweep led the Commonwealth to
founder on the fourth prong.194 The Commonwealth argued that exception for dining
establishments and the proscription of only specific words demonstrated that the law was
narrowly tailored.195 The court rejected that assertion, pointing out some of the illogical
outcomes of the regulation as it was written.196 Moreover, the ABC Board did not establish that
it actually had contemplated these exceptions when creating the law, and the court was not keen
to accept the Board’s “retrospective gloss” on the matter.197 The district court proceeded to
mention the overabundance of persons affected by the restriction, many of whom have a First
Amendment interest in receiving accurate information about alcohol products and distributors.198
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the ban on
alcohol advertisements in college student publications passed the third and fourth prongs of the
Central Hudson test.199 Judge Dennis Shepp, writing for the majority, stated that the regulation’s
link to decreasing alcohol demand was “amply supported by the record.”200 He referred to the
generally accepted connection between advertising and demand for products in judicial
decisions201 and found the link was especially strong in this situation because college student
publications are inimitable and are directed at college students.202 Judge Shepp also accepted the
193
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Board’s claim that the link was further legitimized by commonsense; vendors would not want to
advertise in college newspapers unless they believed the ads stimulated college students’ demand
for alcohol.203
As for the fourth prong, the majority found the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve
the state’s “interest [in] establishing a comprehensive scheme attacking the problem of underage
and dangerous drinking by college students.”204 The court supported this conclusion by stressing
that the regulation did not apply to every college student publication, but only to those aimed at
students under the age of 21.205 The law also permitted dining establishments to advertise the
alcohol they serve.206 Judge Shepp emphasized that the ABC Board used the regulation as a
“cost-effective” complement, not substitute, to other efforts combating underage and abusive
drinking.207 He maintained that the Board would have to increase its alternative prevention
efforts without the regulation, which would strain its already limited resources.208 Finally, the
majority dismissed the newspapers’ claim that other non-speech methods could better curtail
underage consumption, determining that the law need not be the best approach, only that it be
reasonable to the governmental interest.209
Judge Norman Moon, a district judge sitting by designation, dissented from the
majority’s conclusion at length.210 Relying heavily on Pitt News, Judge Moon determined that
the Board’s evidence regarding §5-20-40(B)(3)’s effect on underage drinking was “speculative,
at best,” which is insufficient to satisfy the third prong.211 He noted that the Commonwealth’s
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own expert revealed that there was no evidence proving the ban advances the desired objective,
and that the evidence suggested the college drinking problem had been worsening in spite of the
inveterate regulation.212 Even if Judge Moon accepted the Board’s “commonsense” assertion
that alcohol vendors advertise to increase demand by college students, he found that such a claim
conflicts with the regulation directly advancing its purpose, which is to decrease underage and
abusive drinking, not drinking in general.213
Judge Moon followed up on the district court’s observation that the regulation’s
exceptions created inconsistencies that discredited the Board’s narrow tailoring argument.214
The regulation allowed a restaurant to promote “beer night” or “mixed drink night” but banned
any advertiser from promoting things such as a wine festival or a “mojito night.”215 The Board
did not provide any practical reason for allowing one kind of advertisement but not the other and
Judge Moon questioned how a restriction could fit its purpose in reducing underage or excessive
drinking when it permits the former advertisements but forbids the latter.216 He then reasoned
that the regulation was not narrowly tailored because, in effect, it applied to newspapers that
were mostly read by those 21 and older.217
V. Analysis of the Circuit Split
The divergent outcomes in the Third and Fourth Circuits illustrate the gaps in the third
and fourth prongs of Central Hudson that have yet to be closed by the Supreme Court. The
Third Circuit’s assessment of Act 199 adopted the Supreme Court’s most recent holdings
regarding the state’s evidentiary burdens. Firstly, then Judge Alito refused to accept the general
link between advertising and demand as adequate proof of direct advancement of the state’s
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interest without more, consistent with Lorillard,218 Greater New Orleans,219 and 44
Liquormart.220 In addition, the Third Circuit appreciated the logical loopholes in Act 199, which
only banned alcohol advertisements in college newspapers and left alternate media outlets
unregulated.221 This type of regulatory inconsistency rendered commercial speech restrictions
invalid in Greater New Orleans222 and Rubin.223 While assessing the fit between Act 199 and
the state’s interest, the Pappert court determined the restriction was overly broad as it infringed
valuable First Amendment rights of adults.224 The Supreme Court similarly protected the speech
interests of buyers and sellers in Lorillard, where it decided a government’s goal in protecting
children does not validate an exceedingly extensive speech prohibition.225 Finally, the Third
Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s trend by requiring that the state show it had utilized nonspeech alternatives in order to satisfy the fourth prong.226 In Greater New Orleans,227 44
Liquormart,228 and Rubin,229 the Supreme Court focused on the availability of alternative, direct
means of regulation.
To the contrary, the Fourth Circuit displayed deference to the Virginia ABC reminiscent
of Posadas and Edge Broadcasting. Judge Shepp cited to the language in Lorillard to accept the
state’s “history, consensus, and common sense” assertions to establish that the ban directly
218
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advanced the goal.230 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit majority relied on the link between
advertising and demand as support of the regulation’s effectiveness. However, Lorillard’s
holding made it clear that the Court did not solely rely on correlation between demand for a
product and advertising because the state presented studies to support that claim.231 Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit dismissed the statute’s gaping loophole for restaurants by declaring that “its
limited exception for restaurants does not render it futile.”232 However, this exception seems
similar to the exceptions found in the casino advertising ban for various types of casinos in
Greater New Orleans, or the exceptions to the alcohol content ban for wines and spirits in Rubin.
Under the narrow-tailoring prong, Judge Shepp was content that the speech restriction
was narrowly tailored because it did not completely ban alcohol advertising in college
newspapers.233 This reasoning emulated the Supreme Court’s analyses in Edge Broadcasting
and Posadas.234 The Virginia ABC Board proffered no evidence that it had ever implemented
alternative measures that its own expert recognized as more effective, anti-alcohol advertising
and increased taxes on alcohol.235 Moreover, the Board also failed to establish that the speech
restriction was a necessary ingredient to the effectiveness of its contemporaneous education and
enforcement programs, as opposed to a convenient option.236 Allowing the legislature to choose
a convenient, speech-prohibiting measure over a less restrictive policy was a hallmark of
Posadas that was outright rejected in 44 Liquormart.237
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VI. Conclusion: An Unclear Future for Vice Advertising
All in all, the Supreme Court has drastically altered its Central Hudson analysis,
especially with respect to vice advertising cases, which went from being effectively outside the
First Amendment’s protection in Posadas and Edge Broadcasting to receiving equal protection
along with other forms of commercial speech. The Court, however, remains ambivalent on how
to apply the test when it comes to the sufficiency of evidence needed to establish "direct
advancement" and “narrow tailoring.” Aside from the ambiguities surrounding the third and
fourth factors, the Central Hudson framework itself is extremely malleable as evidenced by the
fact that the Supreme Court has utilized the same four-pronged approach for over 30 years to
produce an entire spectrum of decisions.238
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to the Central Hudson analysis was a considerable
deviation from the Supreme Court's latest analyses of vice advertising regulations. The court
erred under the third prong by accepting the State’s deficient evidentiary record and by
overlooking the inconsistent and irrational aspects of the regulatory scheme.239 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit did not fully consider non-speech alternatives and First Amendment interests,
which have been the focus of the Supreme Court's application of the narrow tailoring
requirement.240
The Fourth Circuit’s departure from the Supreme Court's recent application of the
Central Hudson in vice cases may be a manifestation of the court’s desire to take a more
deferential approach to government legislature concerning vice advertising’s effect on youth.
On the other hand, it is possible that the court was simply a victim of the overwhelming amount
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of conflicting language in Supreme Court opinions over the past two decades, all of which
remain valid as Central Hudson still controls. Either way, the Central Hudson framework
permits lower courts to reach the opposite conclusion when faced with similar laws. This
jeopardizes one of society’s most unique and fundamental rights and should be resolved by the
Supreme Court, either by overruling Central Hudson and providing full First Amendment
protection to commercial speech, or by clarifying the specific hurdles the government must
overcome under the third and fourth prongs of the analysis.

